and the Future of International
Violence
Organized
View of the Emerging Issues
A Practitioner's

Law:

by Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.
like to thank theAmerican Society of International Law for allowing me this
to
opportunity discuss some emerging issues of international law as itrelates to the organized
violence we know as war. I should say thatmy assignment isgreatly facilitated by a paper that
theU.S. Army's Strategic Studies Institute very kindly published forme this past January.
That essay, Technology and theTwenty-firstCentury Battlefield: Re-Complicating Moral Life
for theStatesman and theSoldier,1 was written with the support of theCarnegie Council on
Ethics and InternationalAffairs, which is sponsoring amajor project examining the legal and
I would

ethical issues of futurewar. I intend to draw heavily upon my essay formany ofmy remarks.
That said, I must make it clear that the views expressed are mine alone and do not
necessarily reflect the official policy or position of theU.S. Air Force, theU.S. Department
ofDefense, or theU.S. Government. Likewise, theviews expressed do not necessarily reflect
the official policy or position of theCarnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs.
More than anything else, the task of legal advisors to modern militaries has been
complicated by the emergence of new technologies. Enormous changes brought about by the
introduction ofmicrochip-based systems have stimulatedwhat has been called a "revolution

inmilitary affairs" (RMA).2
Advanced precision-guided munitions (PGMs)3 are a good illustrationof themilitarization
of the new technologies. PGMs have ledmany to assume thatwe are on the threshold of a
more humane ifnotmore law abiding era ofwarfare.

Such assessments, reinforced by oft-televised pictures of PGMs in operation, helped
create new paradigms and expectations about the conduct ofwar. In his book, Beyond theWild
Blue: A History of theU.S. Air Force 1947-1997, William Boyne observed that today's mil
itaryleadersmust deal with two related aspects of post-Vietnam and post-Gulf War America.
The first is the growing aversion in both the electorate and the uniformed ranks to incurring
virtually any friendly casualties inmilitary operations.4 The second, which Boyne points out
"is unusual in history,"5 requires wars to be won with "a minimum number of casualties
inflicted on the enemy"6 Such expectations are much beyond the standards required by the
international law of armed conflict (LOAC).

1
Charles J.Dunlap, Jr.,Technology and the Twenty-first Century Battlefield: Re-Complicating Moral Lifefor
the Statesman and the Soldier, U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, Jan. 15, 1999.
2
For a discussion of "the revolution inmilitary affairs" in the information age see generally, Select Enemy.
in Warfare, foreign affairs,
March 8, 1997, at 21; Eliot A. Cohen, A Revolution
Delete., THE economist,
1996, at 37; Andrew F. Krepinevich, Cavalry toComputers: The Pattern ofMilitary Revolutions, THE
Mar./Apr.
inMilitary
national
interest, Fall 1994, at 30; and James R. Fitzsimonds and JanM. Van Tol, Revolutions
Affairs, joint force Q., Spring 1994, at 24.
3
There are at least six categories of PGMs: (1) "man-in-the-loop" weapons such as laser-guided bombs which
sensors which allow an operator to guide
require an operator to "illuminate" the target orweapons that have on-board
theweapon to the target; (2) autonomous weapons relying only on inertial navigation systems (INS) and autonomous
with
weapons updated by Global Positioning Satellites (GPS) for guidance to the target; (3) autonomous weapons
terrain-aided INS/GPS systems; (4) autonomous weapons with INS/GPS systems and template matching algorithms
for guidance; (5) anti-emitter PGMs that rely on onboard systems to home on emitting targets such as enemy radars;
and (6) PGMs with "smart" submunitions thatuse various sensors to guide themselves to targets. See john BlRKLER
at 6-11
War Military
Strike in Post-Cold
for Precision Conventional
et al., A Framework
Strategy,

(1996).
4

Walter

j. Boyne,
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at 7 (1997).

'Id.
"Id.
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We have already experienced the implications of this new paradigm. For example, the
Gulf War air attack on Iraqi forces retreating down what is now popularly known as the
"Highway ofDeath" fully complied, inmy view, with the law of armed conflict.Nevertheless,
uncertainties as to the impact on world opinion of the shocking televised images of the de
struction contributed to thedecision to end theground war afteronly one hundred hours. This
is, perhaps, a good example ofwhy perceptions of the lawfulness of the conduct ofmilitary
operations are so important.ProfessorsW. Michael Reisman and Chris T. Antoniou explain:

Inmodern popular democracies, even a limited armed conflict requires a substantial base
of public support. That support can erode or even reverse itself rapidly, no matter how
worthy the political objective, ifpeople believe that thewar is being conducted in an
unfair, inhumane, or iniquitous way.7
Of course, one hopes?and
rightlyexpects?that American troopswill fight in an ethical
and lawful way simply because it is the right and moral thing to do. But as Reisman and
reasons for doing so
Antoniou indicate, there are very practical and almost Machiavellian

these days. In order to succeed inmodern conflicts, that is, tomaintain the Clausewitzean
notion of the "people's" support, it is necessary to act in compliance with international legal
mores not only in fact, but also inperception.
This new paradigm?which
ismore a political requirement than a legal one?is generally

understood by the current generation ofmilitary officers, at least in theUnited States. Most
military personnel are, for example, well aware of the law of armed conflict and especially the
importance of avoiding collateral damage and civilian casualties. My own experience during
1998 convinces me that as a nation we have enjoyed
Operation Desert Fox inDecember
considerable success at ensuring that our military personnel have received the necessary
training.Rarely were there any instances inwhich serious LOAC issues, per se, were raised.
If anything, therewas a predisposition to take extraordinary steps beyond those required by
international law.
Complicating military operations today is thenew technological capability of the global
news media to examine every detail of virtually any use of force. Thus,
military operations are

very rapidly subject to judgment in the court of world opinion. As a practical matter, this
means thatmilitary leadersmust not only act in a lawful fashion,
theymust be able toprove
that they have done so. Consider the situation that arose in connection with the raid by U.S.
forces on a pharmaceutical factory in the Sudan inAugust 1998.
This facilitywas believed by American intelligence tobe, among other things, connected
with a precursor compound, EMPTA, used in themanufacture of thenerve gas VX.
Following
the raid,however, thenews media widely reported thattheplant also manufactured medicines,
thus raising questions about thepropriety of the strike. Initially,U.S. authoritieswere reluctant
to release any details of the information justifying the attack. However, pressure from the
world community, including several allies, eventually resulted in amore
specific accounting.
In the futuremilitary leaders contemplating an operation against an urbanized, dual-use
targetmust accept that theymay very likely be obliged ifnot by law, thenby popular opinion,
to disclose supporting evidence. Where the sources and methods of the
intelligence systems
thatprovide such data are too sensitive to allow such disclosure, consideration must to be
given to identifyinga differenttargetor node, one evidenced by less sensitive sources. In other
words, military leaders must be prepared to openly prove the legitimacy of the targeting

7
W. Michael
Reisman and Chris T. Antoniou,
The Laws of War,
at xxiv (1994). This trend has led
Edward Luttwak to argue that an even greater investment in
technology is required because modern democracies
simply cannot tolerate casualties. See Edward Luttwak, Post-Heroic Armies, foreign affairs,
July/Aug. 1996,
at 33.
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decision or risk losing the critically importantperception of legal and ethical correctness so
important to the use of force by democracies.

Dual-use targets?targets having both civilian and military applications?will
present
increasingly difficult legal and ethical challenges. Attacks against infrastructure?including
dual-use electrical grids and communications systems thatsupportwar-making capacity?have
long been a staple of theAmerican way ofwar. Using advanced PGMs, theU.S. military now

has the capability to attack such targetswith tremendous accuracy, often causing little, ifany,
apparent collateral damage.
Itwould be amistake, however, to conclude that such precise attacks necessarily obviate

legal andmoral complications just because the immediate casualties (including noncombatant
losses) may be few.8Noncombatants inmodern and modernizing societies are increasingly
dependent upon such infrastructurefor everything frompowering water purification plants to
managing essential food and health delivery systems to 911 calls.
Clearly, the secondary or "reverberating effects," that is, the effects beyond the relatively
small immediate losses caused by the kinetic effects of a PGM, may be quite devastating to

noncombatants invulnerable, technology-dependent societies.9 In a penetrating article in the
Fletcher Forum ofWorld Affairs,Navy Commander JamesW. Crawford explains:
Precision technology limits the immediate and direct harmful effects of aerial bombard
ment. However, one must take issue with the assertion that the systematic destruction of
the civil infrastructurethrough theuse of precision weapons actually reduces theharmful
effects of war. Ironically, the very capability of precision potentially augers greater
collateral casualties, not less... [PGMs are] clearly an efficient and effective application
of force . . .Unfortunately, such a methodology not only impedes the enemy in some
respects, but italso eliminates civilian life-support systems.10
This does not, of course, mean that such systems cannot be attacked.What itdoes mean
is thatmilitary leaders and their legal advisors need better decision-support tools. They need
the data to allow them to evaluate whether or not themilitary advantage likely to be achieved
is outweighed by the adverse effectson noncombatants and theirproperty; inotherwords, they
need the informationnecessary to conduct the "proportionality" analysis required by inter
national law and ethical warfare.11
One way of obtaining thenecessary tools and data might be to employ thenew modeling
and simulation techniques now becoming available. For example, using data drawn from the
JointResource Assessment Data Base, theU.S. Strategic Command's StrategicWar Planning
System can project the expected numbers of killed and injuredwhen a given nuclear weapon
is delivered by a designated platform in a certain fashion on the selected target.12Similar

8
See Winn

security
computer
Schwartau, The Ethics of Civil Defense and Information Warfare, J.nat'l
June 1997, at 15, 16-17.
news),
(ncsa
9
James W. Crawford, The Law ofNoncombatant
See Commander
Immunity and the Targeting of National
aff.
101 (Summer/Fall 1997).
F. world
Electrical Power Systems, 21 fletcher
10
Crawford, supra note 9, at 54.
11
it "may be
Essentially, the concept of proportionality requires commanders to refrain from attacks when
or combination
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects
in relation to the direct and concrete military advantage
anticipated." See
thereof, which would be excessive
Conduct ofAir Operations, Nov.
of the air force pamphlet (afp) 110-31, International Law?The
department

ass'n

19, 1976, para. 5-3c(l)(b)(I)(c).
12
The system uses terms thathave specific definitions and this affects the evaluation. For example, "casualties"
are defined as the "estimated number of people who die or receive injuries that require medical treatment due to short
term effects (6 months) of nuclear detonations." "Population at Risk" is defined as the "total civilian population in
See
danger of dying, independent of shelter, from short term (6 months) effects of nuclear detonations."
plans and policy direc
memorandum,
Acronyms/Definitions Used in SIOP Analysis (U), USSTRATCOM
Branch
Force assessment
torate,
(Apr. 1997) (on file with author).
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systemsmight be developed to analyze the effects of conventional attacks on high-technology
networks.

However, modeling and simulation themselves present significant re-complications for
military leaders. Specifically, are these leaders legally ormorally obliged to follow themodel?
Suppose, for example, thata decision maker chooses a course of action that themodel shows
will result in greater noncombatant casualties than another available option. Since the legal
duty is to "take all feasible precautions" to avoid noncombatant casualties,13 if a computer
calculates thata certainmethod of attack among several options most minimizes noncombatant
losses, does that automatically preclude consideration of the other options? If a commander
selects another option, has he or she failed to do everything "feasible" to avoid noncombatant
losses? How will a commander justify a decision that seems to fly in the face of dispassionate

computer logic?
As technology progresses one might fairly expect thefidelity of themodels to improve,14
but it is not yet clear that they can ever substitute for the judgment of the commander in the
performance of thewar-fighting art. The linear,mathematical nature of computer processes
may never be able to replicate the nonlinear and often unquantifiable logic of war.15 The
history of human conflict is litteredwith examples of how military forces achieved results that
no algorithmwould have predicted.16 Still, theworld increasingly considers reports provided
by an electronic brain innatelymore authoritative thanhuman-derived analyses. Thus, itmay
legal advisors tomilitary leaders in future conflicts to somehow capture their
rationale when selecting a computer-produced option that appears to be more casualty
intensive than another course of action assessed by the same source.
There is a flip side to the issue of dual-use facilities, and that is the increasing reliance of

well behoove

the United States' own forces upon them. International law admonishes belligerents to
separatemilitary and civilian facilities.During theGulf War, for example, Iraqwas excoriated
inmuch-reported incidents in which combat aircraft and other military equipment were
deliberately placed inproximity tononcombatant cultural and religious facilities.Nevertheless,
we are seeing troubling trends in our own country. Because of budgetary pressures, as well
as the nature of technology, theUnited States can no longer afford tomaintain many
high
technology capabilities separate from those found in the civilian sector.Nowhere is this use
more extensive than in the communications arena. The U.S. armed forces?like othermodern
militaries?relies

heavily

upon

the civilian

communications

infrastructure;

more

than ninety

percent of itsmessages flow through commercial channels. This has caused concern to
Professor Dan Kuehl of theNational Defense University's School of InformationWarfare. He
says thatthis "growing interminglingin the integrated informationsociety of systems used and
needed by both themilitary and civil sides of society ... ismaking our national information

13
See AFP 110-31, supra note 11, para. 5-3c(l)(b)(I)(c).
14
See generally Paul R. Camacho, Further Development
in theConstruction of Political Action Expert Systems
on Social Science Variables, a presentation for the Biennial
International
Software: Fuzzy Logic Techniques
Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Baltimore, Md., Oct. 24-26,
1997
(unpublished paper on file with author).
15
"War is typically nonlinear, meaning the smallest effects can have
unpredicted, disproportionate conse
quences." See JeffreyMcKitrick, et. al, Revolution inMilitary Affairs, in BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE (Air Univ.,
1995). See also Glenn E. James, CHAOS THEORY: THE ESSENTIALS FORMILITARY APPLICATIONS 57-95 (Newport
Paper No. 10,Naval War College,
1996) (discussing the limitations of computer modeling).
16
Robert N. Ellithorpe, Warfare in Transition? American Military Culture
Prepares for the Information Age,
at 4, a presentation for the Biennial International Conference of the
Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and
1997 (unpublished paper on file with author) ("History has demonstrated the
Society, Baltimore, Md., Oct. 24-26,
fatal error ofmilitary decisions based on the use of scientific and technical
analysis at the expense of understanding
thewarfighting art.").
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infrastructurea viable, legal and ethical target in the case of conflict."17Military leaders thus
have a moral and legal responsibility to carefully consider the implications of creating bona
fide targets out of systems on which noncombatants are increasingly dependent.
Of particular concern in this regard is the role of space in future conflicts.Many space
systems have dual uses. Satellites provide critical surveillance and communication support for
both civilian enterprises andU.S. forces. The same is truewith respect topotential adversaries.

According toGeneral Charles A. Horner, theGulf War hero and former commander of the
U.S. Space Command, space systems are "fundamental tomodern warfare."18While there are
some purely military space systems today, theU.S. military itself relies heavily on civilian
satellites,many ofwhich are owned by international consortiums. These same systems are vital

to the health of purely civilian activities inmany nations.
Because of the importance of space tomilitary operations, the former commander in chief
of the U.S. Space Command, General Howell Estes, has argued that war in space is
inevitable.19Unsurprisingly, therefore theU.S. Space Command has established a Space
Warfare Center and has aggressively advocated having "space" declared itsarea of operations

so as to facilitate planning for conflict there.20Similarly, the formerAir Force Chief of Staff,
General Ronald Fogelman predicted that space would someday become the service' s principal
focus, the service evolving from an air and space force to a space and air force.21
However, there is little international appetite for thenotion of conflict in space. Virtually
every treaty related to space asserts that it is to be used only for "peaceful purposes."22 Is this
because the community of nations has suddenly become pacifist? Not likely. The real reason

is self-interest:Most nations have increasing dependence upon space systems yet few have any
capability to conduct operations there.The United States, as the leading spacefaring nation,
may not be as vulnerable to the technical challenges thatdeter others from space operations.
However, itmay well find itself restrained from space warfare by ethical and political
considerations. Space systems present the classic legal and moral conundrum posed bymulti
user items:How do you attack themwithout causing disproportionate injurytononcombatants

and theirproperty, especially when the same system is used by nations not involved in the
conflict?
As a practical matter, it is difficult to foresee many scenarios inwhich a proportionality
analysis would justify attacks on multi-user systems. This is especially true as noncombatants
in a growing number of countries become ever more reliant on space-based technologies for
a whole range of essential communications and other services. In a fascinating article in the
autumn 1998 issue ofParameters, Frederick Kagan points out thatjust such considerations are

likely tomake itpolitically infeasible for theUnited States to ever wage space warfare.23
This may, however, provide an opportunity for legal considerations to dovetail with
practical military and political realities. In otherwords, itmay be shrewder to now pursue a
legal regime that declares space a "sanctuary" similar to that afforded communications
17
Daniel

'96,
Kuehl, The Ethics of Information Warfare and Statecraft, paper presented at InfoWARcon
(Sept. 10, 1996) (copy on file with the author).
Washington, D.C,
18
As quoted by George Wilson. See George C. Wilson, Like It or Not, Space Warfare isWay of Future?and
Past, Air Force Times, June 28, 1994, at 70.
19
See JenniferHeroema, A.F. Space Chief Calls War in Space Inevitable, space news, Aug. 1-18, 1996, at 4.
20
See U.S. Space Command, U.S. Space Command Vision for 2020 (1997), at 6.
21
A vision for the 21st century air force (1997), at 7.
As quoted inU.S. air force, global
engagement:
22
See, e.g., Article I, Treaty on Principles Governing theActivities of States in the Explorations and Use of
No. 6347; 610
Outer Space, Including theMoon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967,18 U.S.T. 2411,1.I.A.S.
U.N.T.S.
205 (the "Outer Space Treaty"). See generally, Richard A. Morgan, Military Uses of Commercial
Satellites: A New Look at theOuter Space Treaty and "Peaceful Purposes ", 60 J.air L. & com.
Communications

237 (Fall 1994).

23
Frederick W. Kagan,
1998, at 112.
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facilities located inneutral territory.This would permit any nation to use space for communi
cations, surveillance and comparable activities?even
during armed conflicts?with the
systems not being subject to attack.
Arguably, a sanctuary strategywould renew theUnited States' original policy toward
space. President Eisenhower established a "self-imposed space sanctuary policy .. .[in order

to] establish theprinciple of freedom of space, toprotectU.S. satellites from interference,and
to avoid an arms race in space"2* "Neutralizing" space would not appear to degrade
America's war-fighting capability, provided U.S. space systemswere thereforeprotected. In
any event, existing legal and policy norms already limit or preclude attack on themultiuser
international systems that adversaries will rely upon during war.

This space neutralization proposal would not preclude subspace means that selectively
deny adversaries' military forces the use of signals from space platforms. However, the
development of lasers and other space weapons would be prohibited, although passive
defensive measures (hardening, stealth, etc.) would be allowed. Accordingly, the proposal
wouldnot be inconsistentwith currentU.S. space policy, which advocates diplomatic and legal
"measures to preclude an adversary's hostile use of space systems and services."25 Some
in fact, already do?argue that themovement ofweaponry into space is inevitable
may?and,
and cannot be effectively banned.26 But the remarkable history of nuclear arms control (during
which many of the same arguments were made) leaves room for optimism?especially
if
action is taken soon.

Paralleling theproblematic commingling ofmilitary and civilian high-technology facilities
is the tremendous infusion of civilians into formerlymilitary jobs thathas occurred of late. In
the past few years, there has been a determined effort to convert as many military billets as
possible to less expensive civilian positions.27 These initiatives have resulted in thousands of
civilians fillingwhat were once military assignments at stateside bases and, increasingly, on

overseas

The

deployments.28

trend toward civilianization exacerbates the long-held fear that new technology
requiring ever-greater civilian involvement will cloud a principle vital to the law of armed
conflict:29 the requirement to distinguish between combatants who could be legitimately

attacked, and noncombatants who could not. As with civilian objects, current international law
requires belligerents to exercise "care to separate individual civilians and the civilian
population as such from the vicinity ofmilitary objectives."30
International law does, of course, recognize thatcivilian technicians and contractors are
necessary formodern militaries. It holds that they are subject to attack only when actually
performing tasks in support of the armed forces. Unlike uniformed personnel, they are not
ordinarily targetedwhen away from theirjobs. If captured, they are entitled to treatmentas
prisoners ofwar.31Nonetheless, the law has always held thatnoncombatants' "immunity from

24
R. M antz, The New Sword: A Theory of Space Combat Power (Air
See Michael
University Press, May
1995) , at 12 {emphasis added).
25
National Science and Technology Council, National
Space Policy
(White House Press Release, Sept. 19,
1996) ,at 6.
26
See e.g., Ben Bova, Laser foes forget crossbow's history, USA today,
January 7, 1998, at 15.
27
The GAO found that 45% ofmilitary personnel performed support functions that could be done
by civilians
for an average of $15,000
less. See Tom Bowman, Shift Military Support Jobs to Civilians, Close
Inefficient
Facilities, GAO Urges, baltimore
sun, April 5, 1997, at 4.
28
Katherine M. Peters, Civilians at War, government
executive,
July 1996, at 23.
29
AFP
110-31, supra note 11, para. 3-5.
30
W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. REV. 1,168
(1990).
31
AFP
110-31, supra note 11, para. 3-3.
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damage and harm was predicated upon their obligation to abstain from hostile acts. If they
took action against a party's armed forces, they automatically lost immunity."32
Unfortunately, reduced civilian immunity appears to be exactly the direction warfare is
heading. Defense News characterized the large numbers of civilian technicians required for the
U.S. Army's digitized battlefield as "surrogate warriors."33 Indeed, the operation of high

technology systems ismoving civilian technicians and contractors from traditional support
functions towhat are arguably "hostile" activities. For example, a civilian technician who
helps execute a computerized offensive informationattack against an enemy systemmay well
have gone beyond mere 'support.' For itspart, theU.S. Air Force has openly announced its

intention to deploy civilians operationally. In Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st
Century Air Force the service states that"combat operations in the 21stCentury" will broaden
"the definition of the futureoperator."34 It goes on to state that: "in the future, anymilitary or
civilian member who is experienced in the employment and doctrine of air and space power
will be considered an operator."1*

Once civilian technicians or contractors become involved as "operators" in "combat
operations", they riskbeing characterized as "unlawful combatants" under international law.36
This has a number of consequences, including the possibility that, ifcaptured these civilians
can be tried and punished for their hostile acts, to include the same things for which a
uniformed combatant would have immunity.37It isvery doubtful thatmany of these "surrogate
warriors" are cognizant of theirnew status or comprehend the ramifications of it.
Another difficult challenge for legal advisors is thatposed when military force is used in
an effort to communicate "messages" to opponents. Although using forcemerely to terrorize
noncombatant civilians is contrary to international law, affecting themental state of an
adversary, degrading morale, and eroding thewill to continue the conflict can all constitute
legitimate military objectives.38 The difficulty, as Geoffrey Best notes, lies in reliably
quantifying such amorphous and often quite culturally specific psychological concepts to the
point where one could reasonably conclude before the attack that a "definite military
advantage" would be achieved.39

32
The Laws of War: Some Concluding Reflections, inthe laws
Paul Kennedy and George J.Andreopoulos,
in the Western World
and
of War: Constraints
on Warfare
215 (Michael Howard, George J.Andreopoulos,
Mark L. Shulman, eds., 1994).
33
See Bryan Bender, Defense Contractors Quickly Becoming Surrogate Warriors, defense daily, March 28,
1997, at 490.
34
A Vision for the 2 1stCentury Air Force
Engagement:
U.S. Air Force, Global
(1997), at 7.
35
A*, at 19.
36
AFP
110-31, supra note 11, para. 3-3 provides:
An unlawful combatant is an individual who is not authorized to take a direct part in
hostilities but does. The term is frequently used also to refer to otherwise privileged
combatants who do not comply with requirements of mode of dress, or noncombatants
in the armed forces who improperly use their protected status as a shield to engage in
hostilities . . .Unlawful combatants are a proper object of attack while engaging as
combatants ... If captured, theymay be tried and punished.
See also Lt Colonel Robert W. Gehring, Loss of Civilian Protections Under theFourth Geneva Convention
and Protocol /, 90 MIL. L. REV. 49 (1980).
37
"Unlawful combatants" are not ordinarily considered "war criminals." Rather, they would be subject to
prosecution under the domestic law of the belligerent who captures them,much as out-of-uniform saboteurs would
be. During World War II, for example, the United States captured eight German saboteurs and executed six. See
II 276 (Rev. and updated by Stephen E. Ambrose based on
New History of World War
American
Heritage
the original text by C. L. Sulzberger, 1997).
38
Handbook of the Law of Naval Operations,
See U.S. Navy, Annotated Supplement to the Commander's
Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 9 (Rev.A) (1989) para. 8.5.1.2 (discussing the prohibition on the bombardment
for the sole purpose of terrorizing civilians) and Parks, supra note 27, at 142 (discussing the general proposition of
purposes as military objectives).
psychological
39
1945 274-275
See Geoffrey
Best, Law and War Since
(1994).
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Targeting forpsychological purposes can be a particular problem forU.S. legal advisors
as Americans ingeneral are not always very good at understanding other cultures. Edward L.
Rowney, a retiredgeneral officer and formerU.S. arms control negotiator, has commented:
Our biggest mistakes stem from the assumption thatothers are like us, when in fact, they
are more unlike than like us. We insist on ascribing to others our cultural traits, not
recognizing thatwe have differentobjectives due to our unique historic backgrounds and
sets of values.40

H.R. McMaster observes inhis book Dereliction ofDuty, for example, that the graduated
to signal U.S. resolve to support
application of airpower during theVietnam War?intended
South Vietnam yet do so in a way that the United States believed demonstrated re
straint?wholly misperceived North Vietnamese thoughtprocesses.
Graduated pressure was fundamentally flawed ... the strategy ignored the uncertainty of
what was the unpredictable psychology of an activity that involves killing, death, and
destruction. To theNorth Vietnamese, military action, involving as itdid attacks on their
was not simply a means of communication. Human
forces and bombing their territory,
sacrifice inwar evokes strong emotions creating a dynamic thatdefies systems analysis
quantification.41

Beyond the difficulties that cultural differences may produce in terms of conducting a
proper proportionality analysis, they also may be the source of tomorrow's wars, ifHarvard
University political scientist Samuel P. Huntington is correct.He contends thatfutureconflicts
will likely be clashes between civilizations with fundamentally different psychological
orientations and value sets than those of theWest.42
Within some of these civilizations, I submit, there is another disturbing phenomenon
brewing, one with grave implications for those concerned with compliance with international
law in bellum. It is described in a brilliant piece by Ralph Peters, then a U.S. Army major, that
appeared in the summer 1994 issue of Parameters. In it,Peters delineated what he calls "the
New Warrior Class," amultitude which he contends "already numbers in themillions." Peters
says that in the future,
[America] will face [warriors]who have acquired a taste for killing, who do not behave
rationally according to our definition of rationality,who are capable of atrocities that
challenge the descriptive powers of language, and who will sacrifice their own kind in

order

to survive.

Along similar lines,military historian JohnKeegan observes that thepost-Cold War world
is experiencing the reemergence of "warrior" societies inChechnya, theBalkans, Afghanistan,
Somalia, central Asia and elsewhere. These are peoples, he says, who are psychologically
distinct from those of theWest, and whose children are "brought up to fight, think
fighting
honorable and thinkkilling inwarfare glorious." A warrior in such societies, Keegan wrote in
1995, "prefers death to dishonor and kills without pitywhen he gets the chance."
I believe thatwe will see?and, indeed, have already seen?these adversaries wage what
I call neo-absolutist war. It iswar without rules, one thatuses
atrocity as a deliberate strategy.
While this has occurred not infrequently in history, such warfare earns its neo- prefix
by
a variety of ways. Such
with the global media?in
leveraging new technologies?along
opponents will attempt to turnour moral, ethical and legal values against us. Why? Because
it seems to provide a way to offset the technological and
military strengths of U.S. forces
without actually defeating those forces on thefield of battle.
40
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The deaths of eighteen U.S. Army Rangers during a mission in Somalia inOctober 1993
were enough to derail U.S. policy there,even though from a purely military standpoint the raid
achieved itsobjectives and theU.S. losses were miniscule compared with those of the enemy.
What proved to be particularly effective, however, was the barbaric treatmentof the body of
a U.S. soldier. The widely televised images of the body being dragged through the streets of

Mogadishu helped destroy the public support that theU.S. military needed to succeed in
Somalia. Consistent with a neo-absolutist approach, the Somalis made no attempt to hide the
savagery of their act.
Americans should also expect enemies to exploit the casualty aversion phenomenon
discussed earlier in thispaper?even at the expense of theirown people. Such tacticsmay have
been unintentionally inspired by the aftermathof thebombing of Baghdad's Al Firdos bunker
during theGulf War. Unbeknownst to coalition target selectors, thatunderground command
and-control facilitywas also being used to shelter the families of high Iraqi officials. After the
devastating attack that destroyed the bunker, pictures of scores of bodies of women and
children being pulled from the wreckage were broadcast worldwide. This caused U.S.
leaders?concerned about adverse public reaction to the noncombatant deaths?to virtually
end furtherraids on the Iraqi capital.

Though the decision to forego furtheroperations against Baghdad had littleeffect on the
outcome of thewar, theprecedent is important.The United States' response to theunexpected
results of theAl Firdos bombing obviously suggests to some foes a cheap and reliable method
of defending against U.S. strikes: cover the targetwith noncombatants. It seems that this tactic
has been embraced by a number of opponents. Human shield tactics enabled the Serbs to

discourage strikesby U.S. and otherNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization planes by the simple
expedient of chaining captured UN troops to potential targets.Libya has likewise threatened
to surround the reported site of an underground chemical plant with "millions ofMuslims" in
order toward off attacks.43
To reiterate, despite U.S. technological prowess that seems to herald an era of surgical
attacks that limit noncombatant losses, I predict that adversaries will seek to offset U.S.
military capabilities by turningAmerican values and adherence to international law against the
United States. The resultmay be organized violence even more savage than in the past.While
there are some military strategies that can be employed to confront thisnew form ofwar, an

importantrole is to be played by such effortsas the InternationalCourt of Justicenow inplace
inThe Hague. I think that there is real value to clearly demonstrating to theperpetrators ofwar
crimes that theywill be called to account for theiractions. Indeed, I favor the use ofmilitary
force to apprehend those suspected of committing atrocities.
That said, Imust tell you that I do not support the new International Criminal Court in its

present form.My opposition is on somewhat differentgrounds thanwhat you may have heard
unwise?to
from other speakers. I believe it is wrong?and
subject American soldiers to
a
not
meet
of theU.S. Constitution. In
court
the
minimum
standards
that
does
prosecution by
an era inwhich theUnited States must rely upon a professional, volunteer force, good civil
military relationsmandates that themembers of such a force be treated as far as possible like

every other citizen. To do otherwise risks the alienation and isolation of the armed forces from
society, a development much discussed lately in sociological circles and, in any event, one not
in the interestsof any democracy. What ismore, theUnited States has repeatedly demonstrated
that itwill bring to justice within its own military system those persons accused of the
commission ofwar crimes and other criminal acts.
Before closing, Iwish to add a fewmore observations. I hope thatmy comments thus far
indicate how necessary it is these days for legal advisers to have a thorough comprehension
43
Libyans
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of not only of the applicable law but of the technical aspects ofmodern war. For example, in
assessing what constitutes a hostile act or an expression of hostile intentjustifying the use of
force, one needs a sophisticated understanding of weapons, platforms and sensors. Legal
advisers must also understand military strategy. In short, in order to be effective, the legal
adviser must be as much of a student ofmilitary affairs as anyone in uniform.
It is my hope that one result of this ninety-third Annual Meeting will be improved

communications between those scholars who think and write about the international law of
armed conflict, and themilitary and civilian legal advisers engaged in thepractice of it.Much
of literatureproduced by even themost respected journals suffers from lack of appreciation
of the new technologies of war and the technical aspects of theiruse. It appears that, all too
frequently,writings are aimed at other like-minded academics. Not enough of the literature
seems tobe directed at thekind of practical, real-world issues thatconfrontpractitioners today.
Those wishing to actually have an effect on thepractice of the international law of war
may wish to consider writing focused articles in journals and magazines readily accessible to
themilitary lawyer in both form and content. For example, Reisman and Antoniou's Law of
War44 contains an excellent summary of awide variety of internationalagreements, along with
some exceptionally insightfulcommentary. There is an additional, very practical reason that

I always take itwith me when I am deployed for an operation: the publication conveniently
fits into the pocket ofmy battle dress uniform.
Furthermore, I believe thata greater effortshould be made towrite LOAC-related books
and articles that are aimed at educating the general public. An excellent example of a
issues is found in an
publication inwhich an in-depth examination of important LOAC
entertaining and readable format is the recent book by Gary Solis entitled Son Thang: An
American War Crime45
In any event, I have only scratched the surface of themany issues in the area of war and
international law thatare emerging today. Finally, Iwish to reemphasize that the comments
and opinions I have presented are simplymy personal views and do not represent those of the
U.S.

or any

Government

44
Supra note 7.
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